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People Flow proposes a regulatory system that is nationalist and discriminatory. Instead we need a global 
system of regulation based on the principles of free movement and universal justice. 
The flow of people is a fact. For a number of reasons, 
including family reunion, economic incentives, and 
demographic trends, the movement of individuals and 
groups has certainly been on the increase in recent 
decades, and is likely to continue in the future. While 
this is hard to deny, assessing the implications has led 
to nothing but controversy. How should we tackle such 
a social phenomenon? On precisely what political 
grounds can we legitimately defend any regulation of 
this movement?  
People Flow  sets out to discuss the possibilities of a 
new political approach. The pamphlet offers some 
suggestions on the principles that might ultimately 
inform such a new system, though inevitably, these are 
neither sufficiently nor comprehensively discussed. 
Further to this, in his latest review of the debate, Theo 
Veenkamp raises the necessity of rethinking the very 
basis of the nation-state together with the meaning of 
national citizenship. I would like to concentrate on 
some of the axiological assumptions underpinning the 
People Flow  prototype.  
The assumptions we make  
Theo Veenkamp, Tom Bentley and Alessandra 
Buonfino begin their study by identifying as a crucial 
question whether “a continuing influx of migrants to 
Europe can be absorbed in a mutually beneficial way”. 
They then affirm that “any successful system for 
managing the flow of people must necessarily 
strengthen the social and economic conditions that 
make the European quality of life so widely prized”. 
Finally the authors add that such a system “seeks to 
manage the movement of people by taking their [the 
migrants’] needs and purpose as a starting point”.  
At first sight, these statements seem to be consistent 
with the declared objective of the report: the pursuit of 
a “mutually advantageous wealth creation”. A more 
careful reading, however, generates some underlying 
problems.  
While it is undoubtedly true that migration inflow can 
be beneficial to the receiving social system in many 
ways, it is equally evident that there are situations in 
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which either residents or migrants have to become 
losers. If the circumstances in which migrants find 
themselves were just per  se, they would not have 
generated such an intense political debate. But 
conflicts do arise, often viciously encouraged by the 
media, on almost every aspect of the migration debate. 
Hence, the underlying principles of any regulatory 
system must attempt to legitimate political priorities 
among all the parties involved.  
Despite the migrant-friendly tone of People Flow, its 
recommendations tend ultimately to favour existing 
residents in the conventional sense. The entire 
proposal is moulded in terms of social and regional 
efficiency. Consistent with this, for instance, migrants 
are only welcome if they can 
contribute to the welfare of the host 
society by bringing with them either 
the financial capital or working skills 
needed by its national labour 
market. A migrant is not admitted if 
he or she is not beneficial to the 
community in this sense. As a 
consequence, residents and migrants 
are granted unequal status. While 
residents are in fact free to be social 
parasites, migrants have to show 
proof of good (mainly  economic) 
intentions. Entire social categories such as artists or 
‘self-made men’ are excluded from Veenkamp’s 
proposal, which bizarrely enough at the same time 
encourages ‘self-reliant travellers’.  
In sum, People Flow  defends a status quo based on the 
particular political priorities of national or regional 
(EU) citizens to date. What happens if we subject this 
approach to a glo bal justice perspective?  
Global axioms of justice  
Let us propose for the moment that global justice 
rather than regional effic iency or national interest 
should be the principle to prevail in international 
migration (see also the contribution of Franck Düvell). 
A new form of citizenship would have to provide new 
criteria for the acceptance of migrants and for the 
distribution of international responsibilities.  
The starting point for such a goal-based cosmopolitan 
argument consists in the recognition of a universal 
right to free movement, a progressive entitlement to 
non-discrimination, and the right to maximise one’s 
opportunities. The domestic right to free movement 
has proved crucial to self-realisation at a national level. 
By contrast, look at all those situations in which 
movement is restricted by legal or financial 
impediments: for example, the prohibition of the free 
movement of nationals in Italy during the period of 
fascist rule; or the poverty which prevents people in 
the developing countries from travelling to another 
part of the country. What is argued here is that an 
international right to free movement would be most 
beneficial to individual well-being, and consequently to 
world welfare.  
Cosmopolitan citizenship as it pertains to freedom of 
movement must form the core element of an 
alternative proposal. Politics is now so globally 
interdependent that social freedom depends on the 
extent to which the individual can express his or her 
consent in several political domains, for example, by 
voting in the country of birth, a 
second country, and eventually, in 
s u p r a n a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
Cosmopolitan citizenship therefore 
recognises the fact that individuals 
can increase their life options and 
their control over their social 
domain, by changing their place of 
residence. This represents a cardinal 
objective of any legitimate political 
system, insofar as it maximises 
w o r l d  w e lfare by fostering 
individual freedom.  
The concept of ‘world citizenship’ represents a crucial 
political step toward the implementation of global 
justice. In acknowledging that traditional statist 
politics draw on concepts of both responsibility and 
vulnerability which are too narrow to deal properly 
with the world’s problems, the citizenship model here 
proposed seeks to bring political agency itself in line 
with a global perspective.  
When it comes to life options, world citizenship 
accords equal status to all of the world’s citizens, 
migrants and residents alike. The principle of non-
discrimination generates the universal and individual 
right to free movement and to civil, social and political 
rights in more than one country (see as a first step in 
this direction the granting of voting rights to migrants 
in EU local elections).  
Political consequences  
The concept of universal citizenship grants any 
individual the right to migrate per se and thus the right 
to be accepted in a foreign country, regardless of the 
eventual contribution to the host community. This 
prerogative, nevertheless, cannot be absolute, 
inasmuch as it has to be balanced (impartially and 
through political dialogue) with the equally legitimate 
The concept of ‘world 
citizenship’ represents a 
crucial political step 
toward the 
implementation of global 
justice.  
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claim of the residents to preserve their options and, in 
the ultimate analysis, with the general imperative of 
maximizing world welfare.  
Such a global weighing mechanism is a moral 
alternative to the current arbitrariness of national or 
regional reception policies, which should be rejected 
for at least two reasons to do with the principle of non-
discrimination.  
In conceding an almost absolute privilege to existing 
residents of nation-states, state-centric policies violate 
the universal right to maximise one’s opportunities. 
Within the present cosmopolitan scheme, national 
citizenship could maintain a certain 
degree of legitimacy by taking into 
account different associative ties as 
universal, indirect, and impartial 
sources of welfare. But this could 
only be warranted if the concept of 
national citizenship had beneficial 
long-term results in terms of 
maximising world welfare, and 
therefore mimicked the demands of 
a cosmopolitan citizenship.  
T h e  n a t i o n a l i s t  o r i e n t a t i o n  
perpetuated in People Flow  should 
also be rejected for the way it 
intentionally discriminates among 
migrants, admitting only those who satisfy the needs of 
the receiving countries (in any case granting them only 
a deficient legal status). As a consequence, the vast 
majority of migrants are unjustly excluded without 
right of appeal. Hence, citizenship can be seen as the 
last bastion of privilege, an obstacle which 
resoundingly fails to meet the general obligation of 
non-discrimination.  
Since an open border policy is not an option in the 
near future, the next question must be how to 
distribute a scarce good equally. The criteria for 
admission then becomes the next battle-ground for a 
new interpretation of citizenship. The only viable 
solution to the constraints caused by the fact that many 
want to enjoy the relevant good (i.e. to be a citizen) and 
yet such a good is not infinite at the national level, 
involves the recognition of citizenship as a good 
infinitely divisible on different levels of political action. 
While state membership still remains inevitably 
subject to some constraints (not all can be American 
citizens), global citizenship is in fact characterised by 
all-inclusiveness (all can be world citizens).  
Alternative regulations based on quotas  
The political alternative to the current “win-all, lose-
all” method of procedure that daily haunts the lives of 
so many migrants, consists in the division of the prize 
in an impartial way, i.e. smaller prizes but equally 
distributed. Universality is here understood as possible 
only through the division of the good in infinite parts, 
temporally distributed.  
Consequently, temporally limited permission of free 
movement becomes the good of this 
new migratory policy, which could 
b e  w i d e l y  a v a i l a b l e  a n d  
c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  l i m i t e d  
extensions regarding the right to 
change primary citizenship and the 
right of settlement. Migrants would 
be accepted in the receiving 
countries on a temporary basis 
(depending on demand but not on 
working skills!) and would have 
civil, social and political rights equal 
to the nation’s existing residents. 
But they would be obliged to return 
periodically to their home countries, 
thus contributing to the sending 
nations in a number of ways, including the transfer of 
financial and social capabilities and the avoidance of a 
brain drain.  
Concurrently, receiving states would have to accept 
temporal quotas allocated by a supranational 
organisation (see the contribution of Arthur C. Helton 
in this debate and the long-standing UN proposal for a 
Conference on Migration and Development), according 
to rules of non-discrimination such as “the most 
favoured nation”, universality of temporary admission, 
and the equality of treatment between locals and 
foreigners. Within this system of burden-sharing, 
through national quotas, each country should admit its 
fair share in comparison with other receiving nations. 
The migratory intake should be based on the receiving 
country’s capacity, in terms of economic conditions, 
territory, demography, history and culture.  
While state membership 
still remains inevitably 
subject to some 
constraints (not all can 
be American citizens), 
global citizenship is in 
fact characterised by all-
inclusiveness (all can be 
world citizens).  
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